

Hindutva Ideology and Development of Political Landscape in Contemporary India

Sanjith Gurikar

3rd Semester BA LLB, PES University, Faculty of Law, Political Thought and Political Obligations

Abstract: *The most common strain of Hindu nationalism in India is known as Hindutva (also known as Hindu Ness). The phrase was first used by Chandranath Basu, and in 1923 Vinayak Damodar Savarkar proposed it as a political ideology. The Sangh Parivar, which includes the Rastriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), the Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP), the Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP), and other groups, uses it. . This ideology has played a tremendously crucial part in the current political landscape of India since its inception, and given its rise over the previous few years, one can definitely predict the role it will play in the future as well. This paper attempts to study the role of RSS in the politics of India over the years and tries to comprehend the impact of Hindutva ideology on government policies while determining whether fundamentalist ideas such as Hindutva are beneficial to a secular democracy like India.*

Keywords: RSS, Hindutva, BJP, Sangh

Objectives

- To understand the role of RSS in politics in India over the years.
- To comprehend the impact of Hindutva ideology on government policies.
- To determine whether fundamentalist ideas such as Hindutva are beneficial to a "secular democracy" such as India.

1. Introduction

The political landscape in India has changed significantly over the last ten years. The Indian National Congress, the country's first political party, lost to the NDA coalition, led by Shri. Narendra Modi, in the 2014 Lok Sabha elections, marking the beginning of the INC leadership's downfall and the BJP's ascendancy. There is no question that the Hindu nationalist Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP), which has been in power in India without interruption since 2014, has taken the lead as the primary political force in the nation.

Under Narendra Modi's leadership, it has successfully won two national elections and, while losing a few states, has constantly extended its pan Indian influence. The formerly dominant local parties appear to have expended much of their genuine power, and the major opponent, the Congress, is clueless and feeble, and Mr. Modi faces no imminent threat.

SuhasPalshikar, a political specialist, alludes to the BJP as India's "second predominant party framework," the first being the Congress, which was headed by former prime minister Indira Gandhi. Since Rajiv Gandhi of the Congress did as such in the elections of 1984, the BJP is the next unrivaled party to procure conclusive triumphs. . Mr. Modi is the "only leader to properly claim overwhelming support all throughout the country" since the assassination of Indira Gandhi in 1984. Mr. Modi's charisma, as well as the legislative concerns of severe division and ardent patriotism, are largely responsible for the BJP's electoral victory.

Its mission is upheld by a relentless organization of workers, a large number of whom are infantry men of its Ideological

spearhead, Rastriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), likewise Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP), an association that has been named the "noisy and aggressive kin of the RSS" by political researchers.

The Rastriya Swayamsevak Sangh is dominantly an upper-caste association, and its banner is the Peshwa sovereigns' "bhagwa." Due to his standing as a brave champion who opposed Muslim Mughal authority, the RSS has consistently depicted Chhatrapati Shivaji Maharaj as their hero. Since the RSS's perspective is upheld and cultivated by animosity toward minority populaces like Muslims and Christians, figures like Shivaji and Maharana Pratap are magnified. Since Mecca-Madina, the Pope, and the Christian Church are beyond India, such social groupings as Muslims and Christians are viewed as "outcasts."

It is direct to infer that the RSS's philosophy is generally directed by religion. This thought is reflected in the RSS's hierarchical construction. KB Hedgewar laid out the RSS in Nagpur in 1925 to furnish Hindus with "actual preparation so they are sufficiently able to oppose against the surge of its adversaries, especially the Muslims" so Hindus could be in great shape to safeguard Holy Mother India, otherwise called Janma Bhoomi and Punya Bhoomi.

One center feature of the RSS from 1925 has been secrecy, which is maintained by an unbending ordered progression in which all authority is moved in the possession of the Sarsanghchhalak, the association's supremo, who gets close help from senior RSS pracharaks who are addressed in the Pratinidhi Sabha. BS Moonje After gathering the fundamentalist chief Benito Mussolini, developed to respect the tyrant and his extremist association, beginning with the Balilla, a gathering of youth foundations planned as a tactical association for Italy's tactical recharging. These were Moonje's perceptions following his experience with Mussolini and the Balilla experience;

"The philosophy of dictatorship by and large advances the idea of individuals' togetherness. India and Hindu India specifically, require such a foundation for the tactical recovery of the Hindus to take out the fake division between

the military and non-military classes among the Hindus that the British so vigorously underlined. However, it was grown independently, the Rastriya Swayamsevak Sangh of Nagpur, drove by Dr. Hedgewar, is of same outlook. "

The central quality of this Hindu association is the military-style preparing given by the RSS unit, or Swayamsevaks. The RSS needs to prepare Hindus in its shakhas so they can guard Bharat Mata from its foes with a sufficient military. Similarly, as with the fundamentalists and Nazis of Italy and Germany, Mussolini and Hitler, the youthful cerebrums should be influenced, subsequently the RSS orchestrates everyday branch gatherings to confer doctrinal and actual preparation to youthful Hindus. Starting with KB Hedgewar and going on through Mohan Bhagwat, each Swayamsevak have gotten this RSS's dedication to belief system.

It is a similar RSS, which is the parent association of BJP, the ongoing most conspicuous ideological group in India, and which sticks to something very similar "Hindutva" philosophy as cutting edge by RSS.

Hindutva (Hindu-ness) is a cutting-edge political way of thinking that advocates for Hindu predominance and tries to change India, which is ostensibly a mainstream state, into an ethno-strict substance known as the Hindu Rashtra (Hindu country). Hindutva is the authority foundation of BJP. Portions of the Indian diaspora, especially those in the United States, support Hindutva too. A few researchers view Hindutva as a subset of Hindu patriotism; however, others utilize the expressions "Hindutva" and "Hindu patriotism" reciprocally.

The paper tries to understand the role of Hindutva in transforming the political landscape of India over the years and tries to analyze whether such an ideology is beneficial to a religiously diverse country such as India.

The RSS and rise of BJP

Before delving into the BJP's relationships with any welfare agencies, it is necessary to apprehend the BJP's contested recognition as a 'religious' political party, in addition to the history with the RSS, which has been defined as "likely the most controversial organization in contemporary India" . Furthermore, it is necessary to evaluate the non-secular factor of Hindutva as stated by way of the RSS and the BJP.

Origins of RSS

"The 'communalization' of politics in India under the British inside the early twentieth century is stated to be one of the key reasons of the creation of the RSS, allegedly as a social enterprise with the only aim of freeing 'Hindustan'. " and the safety of "Hindu" tradition. In truth, a confluence of reasons, inclusive of rifts in Hindu-Muslim family members and among top-caste Brahmins and non-Brahmins, as well as fears of Western cultural having an impact on, furnished the best ground for the creation of the RSS. "

Certain occasions within the early 1920s not only brought to the fore theological differences among Muslims and Hindus in India, but also pressured communal conflicts into the

world of Indian politics." Tensions among the two groups accelerated within the following years (1923-1926) with all people trying to defend their religious pursuits and identity in specific approaches. "

Political historians often regard this time and the founding of the RSS as the peak of the "Hindu Revival", for the duration of which "social and political movements" and sanghatanas (organized organizations) along with the Arya Samaj and the Hindu Mahasabha took form and played a critical function.

The Hindu Mahasabha led the Sanghatan movement and "united several Hindu groups, together with some Congress leaders, at the same platform, advocating a strong Hindu network to match the might of the Muslims". The RSS became founded by means of Hindu nationalist leaders who "capitalized on a growing Hindu feel of vulnerability". In the midst of this communal unrest, Keshav Baliram Hedgewar, a Maharashtrian 'Brahmin', based the RSS in 1925 in Nagpur, the highbrow middle of the Central Provinces.

Hedgewar "engaged in politics, mainly with the Congress, however from a Hindu point of view". However, he saw the collapse of the 'Non-Cooperation Movement' and next riots because of Muslims in India developing the sense of ". . . Muslims first and Indians second. . ." (from an legitimate RSS guide, mentioned through Basu et al, 1993), indicating Muslims' allegiance to their community rather than the country. As an end result, Hedgewar came to believe that most effective Hindus should liberate India and maintain its Hindu way of life; he became additionally satisfied that Muslims were "anti-patriotic" and enemies of Hindus and that the two groups could by no means unite as brotherhood for a common country. He also argued that at the same time as the Hindus had greater personnel and assets than the Muslims and the British, what they lacked as a network was an experience of ". . . National cognizance and concord" whilst what was required turned into "national cohesion" towards each. In order to withstand the deceitful actions of the Muslims and to cozy a Hindu Rashtra, or a country with Hindu tradition, the Hindus, in his opinion, had to be prepared right into a committed and disciplined organization. RSS happened because of this perceived necessity.

Some "socio-political analysts" have doubts approximately regarding Hedgewar's issues about the allegedly treacherous behavior of Muslims. They argue that the warfare of interest among Brahmins and non-Brahmins was Hedgewar's principal concern, and argues that the status quo of the RSS changed into without a doubt "an upper-caste response to self-assertion efforts by oppressed corporations inside the Hindu fold". This is in particular real for the reason that the mid-nineteenth century additionally saw the upward push of anti-Brahmin and anti-Dalit actions in Maharashtra under Ambedkar. According to Bidwai (2004), the RSS commonly catered to Maratha Brahmins and that its membership became initially confined to Brahmins from West and Central India. In addition, V. D. Savarkar and Golwalkar, the 2 architects of the RSS and Hindutva philosophy, were Maratha Brahmins. Thus, the founding of the RSS and the promotion of Hindu nationalism as its philosophy seem to

were motivated by means of the conflict of pastimes between Brahmins and non-Brahmins as a great deal because of the conflicts among Hindus and Muslims. This speculation is supported via the observation that the RSS still seems to be a stronghold among top caste Hindus. Today, if RSS had been some other social welfare enterprise, it might be recognized truly as certainly one of the largest and high-quality non-governmental development organizations (Sangh Parivar) inside the country, working in fields as various as training, fitness, tribal welfare and girls' welfare, including emancipation, unions, disaster remedy and aid. However, the organization's purpose, doctrine and constitution, in addition to its use of certain Hindu worship symbols, supply it an enormously "Hindu" person and exceptional Hindu "profile".

The RSS Hindutva agenda was delivered whilst Hedgewar changed into pushing for a Hindu Rashtra, or Hindu country, and his successor, M. S. Golwalkar, described the Hindu nation as a place where. . . "non-Hindus. . . embrace the culture and language should, the Hindus have to discover ways to respect and honor the Hindu religion, having no different thought than the glorification of the Hindu state. They should give up to be foreigners, or else they'll continue to be numerous. . . "

Organizational Structure

The Hindu sanghathan (organization) serves as the foundation for the RSS's pyramidal organizational structure. The sanghathan is divided into three levels for management purposes: national, provincial or state, and local. Each level is led by a team leader whose responsibility it is to develop and support the different Shakhas, or units, of the Sangh. The RSS's overarching leader and philosopher, the sarsangchalak, stands at the apex of the pyramid, supported by a gathering of state sangchalaks, pracharaks (preachers and promoters), and CWC members, as well as delegates from several state-level legislatures. Below this, at the state level, there is an elected assembly presided over by a state sangchalak, who is typically a prominent figure from the area and helps the organization gain credibility and promote the creation of resources. A city (Nagar) committee sits above the mandal committee, which oversees a set of shakhas from a certain "locality" at the local level.

The most significant units are the "shakhas," which are found at the base of the pyramid and make up the Sangh. Each shakha is composed of roughly 100 male volunteers known as "swayamsewaks," and is led by a Chief Teacher and Secretary in addition to other unit heads. The shakhas' team leaders direct them as they engage in a series of mundane activities during their regular meetings. The activities necessarily include physical training and team building through group games and exercises, apart from regular discussions on topics related to the history, geography, philosophy and culture of Hindu Rashtra, as the purpose is to build both physical and mental levels. strengths of individuals and incorporate them into the fold of Hindu culture and tradition.

There is a close link between the shakha members, and the shakha leader has responsibilities like to those of the head of

a Hindu extended family, including offering assistance when necessary. According to Kanungo (2002), this is a "unique brotherhood" that is united by a shared observance of customs, garb, terminology, conversations, and involvement in group activities.¹

The strategy of the RSS is to reach out to every person and pierce the nation's social structure in order to create a country that is not only morally and socially upright but also mentally and physically healthy and unified in a single national culture. Reaching out to the most remote areas of the country was made possible by a growing network of shakhas and their regimented schedule. The shakhas have progressively expanded throughout the years, beginning in Nagpur in 1925 with a small group of swayamsewaks.

There are currently 43, 905 shakhas in 30, 015 villages and metropolitan locations nationwide, according to the RSS annual report for 2009. However, the official website also states that because RSS does not maintain a formal record of membership or a registration of swayamsewaks, it is challenging to "count" the precise number of members² (www.rss.org)

BJP-A Religious political party?

The Bhartiya Jan Sangh and, later, the Bhartiya Janata Party were created as a result of the RSS's growing desire to have an impact on all aspects of society via the promotion of its Hindu Rashtra philosophy. The RSS constitution and its leaders both assert that the RSS is only a cultural organization without any political aspirations or, surprisingly, a religious objective. However, political authors have consistently refuted these claims.

The RSS painstakingly tried to keep itself out of active politics for the first two decades of its existence (in fact, until the end of the 1940s), ostensibly out of concern that such involvement would corrupt the swayamsewaks' minds, foster individual ambitions, and lead to rivalry and strife within the organization. Hedgewar was leery of any participation that he believed might undermine the goals and activities of the RSS, notwithstanding his connections to political After the establishment of the RSS, his contribution in the 1930 "Dandi March," which prompted his confinement and a year in prison, was seemingly the greatest political demonstration of his life. Hedgewar, be that as it may, developed strong relations with other Congress detainees while he was imprisoned, which later supported him in building the RSS organization. Like this, Hedgewar not just drew motivation from a portion of the Hindu Mahasabha's chiefs (Savarkar and Monjee), but at the same time had the option to spread the impact of the RSS all through the nation's north and northwest because of his connection with the Mahasabha, a mutual benefit association.

Rather than joining the Mahasabha as a political association, Hedgewar's clear point was to dazzle Hindu pioneers with the strength and ability of prepared and exceptionally

¹Kanungo (2002)

²www.rss.org

focused RSS volunteers by loaning them for meetings and afterward benefiting from the generosity acquired. As per Basu et al. (1993), Hedgewar planned the RSS to keep on being a "social" association that pursued long haul objectives through ". . . quiet however supported physical-cum-philosophical preparation of units." This "social"/"political" struggle has persevered over the course of the RSS, as per Basu et al.

Golwalkar took this vision further and looked to make the RSS a "transmitting focus" of the relative multitude of standards of (Hindu) society. He accepted that culture ". . . shapes society along right lines" and that legislative issues can never make an enthusiastic country of individuals (Bhishikar, 1999). Golwalkar presumed that the reason for Hindu Rashtra could be progressed without cognizant contribution in governmental issues. He accepted that social samskaras (customary principles) and sacrificial social association would make a condition of "pure patriotism". As such, Golwalkar appears to have expected to make a Hindu Rashtra whose values would envelop all parts of life to impact legislative authority eventually.

Albeit the RSS didn't effectively participate in legislative issues in a long time after its establishing until 1950, it effectively utilized its political contacts to foster its organization and allure while circumspectly cooperating with ideological groups. It additionally attempted to try not to agitate the British specialists and avoided the spotlight. It is fascinating to take note of that the principal significant conflict with the public authority happened not long after autonomy when the RSS was restricted because of its (past) association with Mahatma Gandhi's assassin, Nathu Ram Godse. In 1948, the RSS was considered unlawful and large numbers of its individuals were kept in prison. The public authority suspended the boycott just in 1949, when the RSS chose to set up a good foundation for itself as a properly perceived association with a composed constitution, to restrict its exercises to the field of culture and to lead its exercises straightforwardly, in spite of continuous conversations with the public authority (headed by Nehru). In any case, as the requests of some RSS individuals for dynamic cooperation in governmental issues became stronger and more tireless, the RSS administration at last surrendered to the well-known request. The RSS didn't have a problem with the specified circumstances, maybe again in light of the fact that it would have rather not drawn in excessive consideration and block its work.

Subsequently, in its initial years, the RSS shows up as an association that was careful about drawing in a lot of consideration from the British-governed state, maybe dreading reprisal from a bigger power and prevention to its own objective. The essential target of the RSS's relationship with the Congress and, surprisingly, the Mahasabha, with which it shared a philosophical fondness, was to grow its own organization. Albeit the free Indian government forced a complete boycott, it decided to acknowledge the boycott implicitly and attempt to have the request lifted as opposed to take part in open clash with the state. In this manner, the choice to frame a political branch seems to have been a very much viewed as one that made the way for a provisional coalition with the Bhartiya Jan Sangh (BJS) and the possible

development of the Bhartiya Janata Party. Organizations like the Congress and Hindu Mahasabha.

While stopping what some intellectuals inside the RSS saw as "non-Bharti and anti-Bharti" practices of the government was another motivation,"its very existence was the underlying motive" for partnering with the political party. The necessity of promoting a Hindu Rashtra both by internal efforts and by governmental institutions was pronounced, and this was most important. Some RSS members also emphasized the need for the organization to "create a political wing for more effective and timelier implementation of its principles". Many individuals inside and outside the organization, especially younger Swayamsevak's and pracharaks, were convinced that the RSS needed to take over the establishment with its own political party, while more conservative groups such as Golwalkar were hesitant to enter the political sphere directly. .

Bhishiker (1999) claims that Golwalkar was adamant about avoiding getting involved in politics, but at the same time he ". . . did not deem it right to repress the workers' urge to get involved in politics. Consequently, the employees were given the freedom to engage in politics while the organization maintained its complete independence from politics. In order to assist Shyama Prasad Mukherjee in founding the Bhartiya Jan Sangh (BJS) in 1951, 43 RSS employees were given permission to do so. The BJS was intended to be a Hindu nationalist alternative to the Congress, but Mukherjee had been attempting unsuccessfully for years to get Golwalkar to support him in his political endeavors. With the RSS and BJS working together, the latter was given access to a skilled and orderly organizational cadre. The Jan Sangh's core was soon made up of young RSS workers, and it's thought that the Nagpur headquarters of the organization also had direct influence over the political party through them.

The compelling and significant role that RSS played throughout the 25 years of its existence and how BJS grew to rely on RSS on a number of fronts, particularly in relation to organizational growth and personnel, are reiterated in various accounts. Deendayal Upadhyaya, an RSS pracharak, took over as party secretary after Mukherjee passed away in 1953, a short time after the party's founding, and suppressed the non-RSS members. As part of his approach, Upadhyaya appointed dependable RSS members to important party positions at the federal and state levels as sangathan mantries, or "organizing ministers. "

The RSS used the sangathan mantries as a route to keep an eye on BJS's pulse and shape it appropriately. This tactic has been carried over to the BJP, BJS's successor. In reality, despite RSS's furious denial to this day, the idea of the sangathan mantries was subsequently transferred to the other RSS branches and developed into a covert means of control.

The BJS afterwards gained additional momentum and established itself as a serious challenger to the Congress, with great reach, under Balasaheb Deoras, who replaced Golwalkar. Deoras is really credited with bringing the RSS into open politics when he saw that after independence, there

was a need for a "national philosophy." In order to meet the demands of the political system, Deoras reformed the RSS. As a result, the shakhas were granted more influence in elections for the legislature as well as other entities, including labor unions. Additionally, the RSS's activity was divided between its parent organization and its affiliates, with the parent organization supervising and regulating the affiliates. Additionally, efforts were made to improve the finance situation, including the introduction of some openness into the fundraising process and the hiring of full-time RSS employees by educational and other institutions at no expense to the RSS. It appears that more money was raised in areas where BJS was in power, highlighting the benefit of working with a "political party."

Deoras also recruited and trained other RSS affiliates, such as the ABVP and the BMS, to overthrow "corrupt and ineffective" administrations, such as those in Gujarat and Bihar in the late 1960s and early 1970s.

The BJS without a doubt profited from its connection with the RSS. As indicated by political history specialist Bipin Chandra (1998), the BJS "inferred its coordinated strength, incorporated structure and philosophical consistency from the RSS". Nonetheless, as Bruce Graham (2005) notes in summing up the authority and authoritative emergency of the BJS, the party was likewise seriously obliged by its standing as near, if not subject to, the RSS; as a radical association with grievous perspectives on the connection among Hindus and other strict networks; and similarly, as with an unpracticed administration that worked in relative seclusion and obscurity.

Moreover, clashes supposedly emerged among RSS and non-RSS individuals from the BJS because of multiple factors, including the dictatorial administration style of the RSS as opposed to the BJS's favored open majority rule strategy, worries about authority and the consideration of shared undertakings in the party's day to day plan. A few individuals from the BJS felt, properly, that the party had been controlled and that the RSS was "driving its direction into the political circle" through the Jan Sangh (Graham, 2005). As a matter of fact, the RSS had such areas of strength for an on the BJS that it seemed to have supplanted the power of the party's regulative chiefs (under RSS control). Subsequently, BJS turned into a coordinated party part of the way because of its connection with RSS and maybe because of a similar association it couldn't gain a lot of headway.

Notwithstanding its hierarchical construction and the aggressor idea of the association, many "political history specialists" (like Curran and Gold, referred to by Kanung in 2002; Graham, 2005) trust that the RSS's promotion of a Hindu state, its traditional direction, and its enemy of Congress position demonstrate that it had political desires from its beginning. The RSS was hugely inspired by legislative issues, however rather than battling for the "projects of the party", they saw legislative issues as a "battle for the social center of the country". It liked to keep a decent standing by acting like the country's "institutional master". The main chance for RSS to test this system was with BJS. Then, rather than depending basically on its

political connection, as a feature of its procedure, the RSS likewise revitalized its different subsidiaries, including ABVP, BMS and VHP, to lead an exceptional development.

The monopoly of the Congress was challenged in the "post-Nehru era" (mid-1960s), after reaching its peak under Indira Gandhi in the mid-1970s. The RSS, along with many others, began criticizing Gandhi's autocratic style of governance and supported Jaiprakash Narayan's campaign for a "total revolution" without overtly engaging in politics. Once again, the partnership was mutually beneficial as Narayan benefited from the RSS cadres while the RSS got the support and backing of the well-known Gandhian leader. For this reason, when the opposition parties came together to present a coordinated effort (Lok Sangarsh Samiti or LSS) to continue the agitation against Indira started by Jayaprakash Narayana Gandhi's successor as General Secretary of the LSS was Nanaji Deshmukh, a pracharak who had previously served. as the then organizational secretary of the BJS. As the conflict intensified, an internal state of emergency was declared, numerous opposition leaders were taken into custody, and the RSS was again banned (1975). There are varying accounts of how the RSS responded to the ban: some say it was cautious, avoiding antagonizing Indira Gandhi and keeping a low profile; however, she is also said to have played a significant role by working closely with the LSS, offering assistance to the leadership and at the expense of widespread arrests of its members.

As a result, RSS's political actions grew stronger and more obvious. After the emergency, RSS developed more tolerant ideologies as a consequence of its exchanges with political parties, and it played a significant role in the creation of the Janata Party (JP). The Janata Party, which later came to power in 1977 as a result of its brave stance against authoritarianism and the abuses of the internal emergency established by Prime Minister Gandhi between 1975 and 1977, amalgamated with the BJS, which by that point was experiencing internal leadership issues. Some of the senior BJS RSS members were appointed as cabinet ministers in the Janata Party-led coalition administration. Later, when several of its swayamsewaks joined the Janata Party and were elected chief ministers of states like Himachal Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, and Rajasthan, the RSS also had success in the Assembly (state level) elections.

Notwithstanding, the non-RSS individuals from the Janata Party tried to urge RSS to join with the youth wing of the party, apprehensive that the RSS would again look to hold onto control as it did on account of the BJS. Incidentally, Deoras went against the arrangement in light of the fact that RSS expected to save the uprightness of its drawn-out social objective. Despite the fact that he seemed to have no doubts about teaming up with political fronts like the BJS and the Janata Party to impact the public authority, he accepted the RSS ought to never turn into a piece of it.

All things considered, Deoras is claimed to have utilized his associations with the Janata Party to build the RSS's impact in fields like grown-up training and social government assistance, accordingly getting subsidizing and developing his base of help. A further layer of defense is given by Kanungo (2002), who fights that his arrangements likewise

upheld the quickly growing RSS and its members' diminishing asset position and spot its full-time workers in worthwhile ventures. The two-dimensional methodology had the effect of expanding RSS's impact inside the public authority as well as its span.

The Janata Party's success, in any case, was momentary due to interior struggle and power fights inside the association. Because of this, the Janata Party lost its political order in the midterm general appointment of 1980, and when the blame shifting started, the issue of the Jana Sangh's "double enrollment" inside the RSS bunch inside the Janata Party became visible again. The RSS's faultfinders said that the Janata Party's connection with the Jana Sangh gave it a communalist picture and wanted for the last option to join with the Janata Party's youth segment. The RSS declined and on second thought invited non-Hindus, proceeding to propel its objective of uniting the Hindu people group. Be that as it may, the public chief of the Janata Party chose to excuse all previous Jan Sangh (RSS) individuals from the party on the grounds that no commonly pleasant arrangement could be reached. Frustrated by the interior quarrels, the RSS administration had additionally come to the choice that it would be ideal for the Jan Sangh individuals to leave the Janata Party and begin their own political "faction." Thus, in April 1980, the removed individuals joined together to make the Bhartiya Janata Party.

In states built on secular ideals, like India, religious forces that seek to acquire political power may create political parties, frequently sparking clashes. In South Asia, some of the major religious political parties are also involved in the delivery of welfare services. Despite the paucity of information regarding their intentions and tactics, their motivations are frequently questioned. The Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP), which has held power at the federal level as the leader of a coalition and on its own in a number of states, is not inherently a religious political party. However, it has significant historical and ideological links to the Rastriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), which bills itself as a "social organization" and has a vast network of affiliates, many of whom are engaged in social welfare operations.

The RSS upholds the thought of a Hindu Rashtra through various associations, including the BJP. The BJP should defy the struggles that come from its association with the RSS and the presence of the Hindutva plan in its political stage to support its electing backing and win majority, as per certain ramifications of these discoveries. The strain to "saffronize" the educational plan to reflect Hindutva philosophy (counting a revising of Indian history) in both government and Vidya Bharati's schools, a significant number of which are enlisted with the focal and state training sheets, should be tended to by the bureaucratic and state services of schooling.

Recently, the RSS has also supported the BJP's election campaign. Rastriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) increased its local efforts to improve the electoral climate for the BJP in Uttar Pradesh. For the campaign, the Sangh enlisted the aid of its frontal organizations. Hindu families were informed of the construction projects completed from Ayodhya to Kashi

with a specific emphasis on getting "every Hindu to the voting booth."

A senior RSS functionary of Kashi prant (Varanasi zone) stated "We are focusing on two programs—the Lok Jagran Manch and the Jagruk Matdata. In the first, we discuss the issues at stake in this election. We have developed a 25-point brochure on the problem of rashtra suraksha (national security), the repeal of Article 370 and 35A from Jammu and Kashmir, the Ram temple in Ayodhya, development activities in Kashi and Mathura, and so on." Also, a senior BJP spokesperson said, "RSS functionaries play an equally vital part in our campaign," Because they do not utilize the party's insignia or flag at their gatherings, they have a large following throughout the state, particularly in central and eastern Uttar Pradesh. Their informal gatherings and indirect appeal are crucial. Because this election appears to be a two-party race, the vote percentage will be important. RSS functionaries also play a role on Election Day, when our supporter participation appears to be lower than it should be by the afternoon."

By recognizing these factors, it can be known that the RSS has assisted the BJP in becoming a pan-India force.

1) Influence of Hindutva in recent governmental policies

The Bhartiya Janata Party of India, which was long on political edges in view of its powerful patriot convictions stressing Hindu supremacy, has had a parliamentary majority from 2014. State head Narendra Modi stirred up ethnic pressures during his re-appointment crusade in 2019 and is currently endeavoring to place in force political bundles that will conciliate libertarians inside his party even as additionally improving India's monetary possibilities and persisting with his ancestors' Multi-arrangement foreign policies.

An assortment of political episodes in India during the most recent couple of years definitely stand out at the creating impact of traditional Hindu patriots inside the Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP) and effect on BJP Prime Minister Narendra Modi, who is thoughtful to their explanation. These progressions incorporate the endorsement of changes to the public citizenship regulation which are seen as oppressive towards Muslims; wiping out the independence arrangements conceded to Jammu and Kashmir, India's only Muslim-majority state (with the exception of the little islands of Lakshadweep), in the Nineteen Fifties; vigilante attacks on Muslims selling or ingesting beef, which is restricted in most parts of India; and carrying out approaches that make relationships among Hindus and Muslims much troublesome. Hindus make up over 80% of India's general population, while Muslims make up 15% regardless of the way that India has additional Muslims (roughly 2 hundred million) than each and every other country other than Indonesia and Pakistan. The improvement of Hindu majority legislative issues, notwithstanding the public authority's eagerness to stomp on at the concerns of the Muslim minority, harmed India's picture as a liberal secular-based system.

Hindu patriotism is an interpretation of the Indian thought of Hindutva, as per which one's "Hindu-ness" is chosen through identity, lifestyle, and race, comprising of whether they have any Indian progenitors in any regard. (This definition envelops rehearsing Muslims as long as they have subcontinental heritage.) Before directing the BJP to its very first victory in 2014, Modi filled in as Gujarat's chief minister from 2001 to 2014. During this time, he fostered an acknowledgment for embracing serious positions concerning the area's Muslims. He became denied a discretionary visa through America in 2005 on the reason that his inability to situate a stop to hostile to Muslim revolting in Gujarat in 2002 which finished in "serious maltreatments of strict opportunity." Modi has continually upheld Hindutva, but taking into account the way that becoming PM, he has moreover come to look the meaning of getting control over political fans in case they imperil India's opportunities for financial increment and its capacity to draw in unfamiliar speculation.

2) Hindutva-A Threat to Secular Democracy?

The largest democratic nation in the world is thought to be India. The nation is renowned for its voluminous range of cultures, multicultural society, and open-minded secular democracy. However, the current political climate has somewhat undermined India's liberal democratic principles.

The most frequent definition of secularism is the exclusion of religion from public life and the state, but the term may also refer to any stance that seeks to eliminate or diminish the influence of religion in any public arena. In its most simplistic form, the phrase "secularism" can refer to any position that supports the secular in any particular setting. However, the term has a wide range of interpretations. It may imply atheism, non-sectarianism, anti-clericalism, neutrality toward religious issues, or the full elimination of religious symbols from government buildings³.

One must consider whether the country's current state is considered to be "secular" in any meaningful sense.

Since gaining its freedom, India has governed its people democratically. India is said to be the biggest democracy in the world. Despite having seen numerous highs and lows, Indian democracy continues to be a model for other countries in the world today.

All the democratic ideals and principles are contained in the Indian Constitution. India is referred to be a "Sovereign Democratic Republic" in the preamble of the Indian Constitution, and this description is reflected in the constitution's articles and schedules. The constitution and those who created it made every effort to solidify and maintain democratic governance, which strengthens more sane institutions and reins in the power of the executive branch. Because of India's democratic administration, the country has a democratic culture that fosters more tolerance and plurality.

However, current majoritarian politics, the cries of Hindu nationalism, and the escalating hooliganism of anti-democratic extremist religious organizations have been driving Indian democracy toward an authoritarian level. The middle and lower middle classes in India have internalized a skewed rhetoric on Hindu nationalism. The entire country is characterized by an anti-democratic political climate, and Hindu nationalists accuse the secular culture of the nation of being "pseudo secularism," which is nothing more than appeasement of minority populations.

The cover page of *The Economist*, a widely read publication with a solid worldwide reputation, with the headline "Intolerant India: How Modi is destroying the world's greatest democracy" in the final week of the January edition in 2020. The quarterly magazine's "Leaders" section featured an editorial headlined "Narendra Modi Stokes Divisions in the World's Biggest Democracy," which claimed that the creation of a Hindu state is frightening millions of Indian Muslims. The journal condemned India for changing the law (the Citizenship Amendment Act of 2019) to make it simpler for adherents of all other religions on the subcontinent—aside from Islam—to get citizenship.

In order to track out illegal immigrants, the government's ruling party, the BJP, plans to create a record of the nation's 130 million people National Population Register according to. *The Economist*

On the Global Democracy Index for 2019, India was placed 51st out of 165 nations, according to the *Economist Intelligence Unit*. Vijay Chauthaiwale, the head of the BJP and a foreign policy specialist for the party, responded to the criticism on Twitter by calling the publication "arrogant" and "colonial in outlook." "We believed the British had departed in 1947, he tweeted. However, the[at] *The Economist* editors continue to operate in the colonial age."

According to the V-Dem Institute's Annual Democracy Report 2020, which is headlined "Autocratization Surges-Resistance Grows," India is experiencing an autocratization trend, along with certain other G-20 nations including the USA, Brazil, and Turkey. The paper claims that India's democracy is suffering under Modi's rule due to the media, civil society, and opposition's significantly reduced space.

The venerable US-based *Time* magazine's (Asia edition) cover story for May 20, 2019, featured Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and referred to him as "India's divider in chief"—a reference to the Hindutva politics of the BJP. According to a magazine article titled "Can the World's Largest Democracy Endure Another Five Years of a Modi Government?" Modi has harassed minorities of all stripes, including liberals, members of lower castes, Muslims, and Christians. The author further condemned by saying, "Not only has Modi's economic miracle fallen flat, but he has also contributed to the emergence of a toxic religious nationalism." The piece was authored by Aatish Taseer, a journalist residing in New York and the son of Pakistani-born Salman Taseer, a former governor of Pakistan's Punjab province, and Indian mother veteran journalist Tavleen Singh. The BJP responded by claiming that the *Time* article was authored by a Pakistani and that "nothing better could

³ <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Secularism>

be anticipated from Pakistan" in a news conference the day after the piece was published. The writer's Overseas Citizenship of India (OCI) status, a permanent visa for Indians, was also revoked by the Narendra Modi administration. . Numerous overseas media outlets voiced their disapproval of the government of India's move. Nobel laureates Orhan Pamuk and J. M. Coetzee, as well as Salman Rushdie, Margaret Atwood, Amitav Ghosh, and Jonathan Franzen, wrote to Modi pleading with him to reinstate Aatish Taseer's OCI card. As the writer challenged the Prime Minister, many academics said that the administration made decisions that were intolerable.

When freedom of expression is consistently infringed, as in the above example, the democracy will cease to exist.

2. Conclusion

The phrase "unity in variety," which permits the coexistence of several distinct cultures without granting benefits to a single group or community, is something that the people of India are constantly proud of. However, recent events in India have raised severe concerns regarding its cultural legacy. The Gita, the Ram Temple, or the cow all become emblems of national identity. This has led a wave of Hindu nationalism to attempt to influence Indian politics. The minority segment has been pushed to the periphery by such intolerant sentiments. In his speeches, Prime Minister Narendra Modi regularly refers to the "new India."

In Modi's "new India," a shift in political culture has been seen. People have a propensity to associate the nation with religion and conceive a powerful, oppressive idea of nationalism. People begin to feel the state and its military wing are powerful enough to attack opponents at any moment in such a climate of new nationalism. A portion of the non-Muslim majority believes that most Muslims are less patriotic and aggressive than other groups. BJP and other right-wing nationalist politicians frequently state in public, "Muslims should not be residing in India; they should move to Pakistan. " This indeed is a threat to India's secularism.

References

- [1] Biswas, S. (2020, December 2). *The secret behind success of India's ruling party BJP*. BBC News. <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-55049627>
- [2] K. (2018, December 21). *Rastriya Swayamsevak Sangh: An ideology that holds a nation*. MyVoice. <https://myvoice.opindia.com/2018/12/rashtriya-swayamsevak-sangh-an-ideology-that-holds-a-nation/>
- [3] Mehta, M. (2003). The Role of Hindutva in Indian Politics. *South Asia Minor*.
- [4] R. R. (2021). THE BJP AND THE RSS – THE EVOLUTION OF A POLITICALPOWER IN RELATION TO A SOCIAL ORGANIZATION. *THE BJP AND THE RSS – THE EVOLUTION OF A POLITICALPOWER IN RELATION TO A SOCIAL ORGANIZATION*.